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THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL                      
LLOYD K. GARRISON LECTURE 
 
 
Inside EPA: 
A Former Insider’s Reflections on the 
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and 
the Obama White House* 
LISA HEINZERLING** 
 
I will be discussing the relationship between the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the White House.  
I will focus specifically on the role that the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), within the Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”), plays in reviewing the EPA’s 
regulatory output. 
As I will explain, OIRA’s actual practice in reviewing agency 
rules departs considerably from the structure created by the 
executive order governing OIRA’s process of regulatory review.1  
The distribution of decision-making authority is ad hoc and 
chaotic rather than predictable and ordered; the rules reviewed 
are mostly not economically significant but rather, in many cases, 
are merely of special interest to OIRA staffers; rules fail OIRA 
 
* This essay is an expanded version of remarks delivered on March 12, 2013, as 
the Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law at Pace Law School. 
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  The author was Senior 
Climate Policy Counsel to EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson from January to 
July 2009, and Associate Administrator of the Office of Policy from July 2009 to 
December 2010.  This essay is based on public documents and the author’s 
experience in those positions. 
 1. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). EO 12,866, issued by 
President Clinton in 1993, continues – in principle – to govern the mechanics of 
OIRA review.  President Obama issued his own executive order, EO 13,563, on 
OIRA review in 2011, but that order reaffirmed EO 12,866 and did not by its 
terms change the process of OIRA review (such as deadlines and disclosure 
requirements) in any respect. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2011). 
1
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review for a variety of reasons, some extra-legal and some simply 
mysterious; there are no longer any meaningful deadlines for 
OIRA review; and OIRA does not follow – or allow agencies to 
follow – most of the transparency requirements of the relevant 
executive order.2 
Describing the OIRA process as it actually operates today 
goes a long way toward previewing the substantive problems with 
it.  The process is utterly opaque.  It rests on assertions of 
decision-making authority that are inconsistent with the statutes 
the agencies administer.  The process diffuses power to such an 
extent – acceding, depending on the situation, to the views of 
other Cabinet officers, career staff in other agencies, White House 
economic offices, members of Congress, the White House Chief of 
Staff, OIRA career staff, and many more – that at the end of the 
day, no one is accountable for the results it demands (or blocks, in 
the case of the many rules stalled during the OIRA process).  
And, through it all, environmental rules take a particular 
beating, from the number of such rules reviewed to the scrutiny 
they receive to the changes they suffer in the course of the 
process.3 
These problems are significant, and they deserve serious 
attention.  Although I discuss these problems at the end of this 
paper, my main objective in this paper is descriptive.  
Misunderstandings of the OIRA process abound.  Too often these 
misunderstandings are perpetuated by, or not contradicted by, 
the very personnel who have been involved in the process.  
Indeed, after I finished a stint as the head of the EPA office 
responsible for acting as the primary EPA liaison to OIRA, I did 
not write at any length about my experiences with OIRA review.  
Partly out of continuing loyalty to the administration that had 
made my time in government possible, partly out of respect for 
the sensitivity of interactions between high-level government 
officers, and partly out of a sense of sheer futility,4 I had resolved 
to move on to other topics.  But when accounts of OIRA’s role in 
 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See Lisa Heinzerling, Towards Engaged Scholarship, PACE L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 19-20), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2225283. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/5
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the Obama administration began to emerge from other quarters,5 
and when these accounts, in many respects, did not jibe with my 
own experience, I decided to resurface and to describe the OIRA 
process from my perspective.  Hence the account that follows. 
I. THE HISTORY OF WHITE HOUSE REVIEW 
It will be useful first to give a brief history of White House 
review of agencies’ regulatory actions.  Some form of centralized 
review of agency action has been with us for decades.  Such 
review took place episodically in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
administrations.6  But, it was during the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan that the practice of regulatory review began to take on 
the shape it has today. 
A. Executive Order 12,291 
In one of his earliest acts as President, Ronald Reagan issued 
an executive order – Executive Order 12,291 – that gave 
centralized review more systematized form in two respects.7  
First, Executive Order (“EO”) 12,291 put a specific office – OMB8 
– in charge of reviewing agency actions.9  Second, it adopted cost-
benefit analysis as the governing framework for this review.10 
 
 5. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013) 
[hereinafter SIMPLER]. See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2013) 
[hereinafter Myths and Realities]. 
 6. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New (Approved) 
Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 536-37 (1986) (describing “rather modest 
and unintrusive” efforts by the White House to control agencies during the 
1970s).  See Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House 
Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209, 239-42 (2012) (providing 
a more detailed discussion). 
 7. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981). 
 8. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS ch. 1.2(c) (1997), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_chap1 (within OMB, OIRA was the 
office responsible for regulatory review).  From here on out in this article, I will 
refer to “OMB” only where I mean to distinguish OMB from OIRA or where (as 
in the Office of Legal Counsel opinion I am about to discuss) another party has 
referred to OMB rather than to OIRA. 
 9. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981). 
 10. Id. § 2(b)-(c). 
3
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Before President Reagan issued EO 12,291, the Office of 
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) reviewed the order for legal soundness.11  
Notably, OLC’s opinion confirming the order’s legality rested on 
the premise that the centralized reviewers (OMB and a newly 
created Task Force on Regulatory Relief) would only supervise, 
and not displace, the exercise of discretion given to the agencies 
by statute.  OLC wrote: “[T]he fact that the President has both 
constitutional and implied statutory authority to supervise 
decision-making by executive agencies . . . suggest[s] . . . that 
supervision is more readily justified when it does not purport 
wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which 
Congress has allocated to a particular subordinate official. A 
wholesale displacement might be held inconsistent with the 
statute vesting authority in the relevant official. . .. The order 
does not empower the [OMB] Director or the Task Force to 
displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory 
functions or in assessing and weighing the costs and benefits of 
proposed actions.”12 
OLC’s opinion does not state that an order displacing the 
agencies’ discretion would certainly be illegal.  But it does 
interpret EO 12,291 not to permit such displacement and it does 
suggest a potential legal problem with such displacement.  
Reading only EO 12,291 and the OLC’s opinion on it, one would 
conclude that agencies retained the decision-making discretion 
they were given by the statutes they are charged with 
administering. 
In practice, though, it was not that simple.  During the 
Reagan years, critics charged that OIRA did indeed displace – 
and not merely supervise – agencies’ decision-making 
discretion.13  In addition, OIRA’s process of review frequently 
 
 11. See Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. 
O.L.C. 59 (1981). 
 12. Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added). 
 13. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have 
Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2487, 2502-05 (2011).  Percival cites a wealth of sources on this point.  Id. at 
2504, n. 127.  Beyond OIRA, Reagan’s appointees to the environmental agencies 
also were quite willing to take deregulatory actions on their own initiative.  See 
generally Philip Weinberg, Masquerade for Privilege: Deregulation Undermining 
Environmental Protection, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1321 (1988). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/5
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delayed agency rules for extended periods.14  The process also at 
times degenerated into one in which OIRA served as a conduit for 
the views of industry on particular regulatory actions.15  This 
feature of the process was especially troubling insofar as the 
process was opaque.  Only in 1986 did OIRA begin to make public 
the documents shared by outside parties with OIRA during its 
review.16  Even so, the bulk of the process – which agency actions 
went to OIRA, what happened to them while they were there, 
who made the decisions – was closed off to the public.17  
Moreover, the cost-benefit lens through which OIRA viewed 
agency rules proved to skew against some kinds of rules, in 
particular environmental rules, since so many of the benefits of 
environmental rules are difficult or impossible to quantify and 
monetize, and since so many of these benefits occur in the future 
while the settled practice of cost-benefit analysis is to steeply 
discount future consequences.18 
Such critiques dogged the OIRA review process under EO 
12,291 through the Reagan years and into the presidency of 
George H.W. Bush.19  By the time Bill Clinton came into office in 
1993, many were hoping for change.20  Within months of taking 
office, President Clinton responded with a new executive order on 
regulatory review, EO 12,866.21 
 
 14. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency 
Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 565-68 (1989). 
 15. See, e.g., Claudia O’Brien, White House Review of Regulations Under the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 51, 58-80 (1993). 
 16. Bruff, supra note 14, at 582 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES SUBJECT TO 
EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 12,291 AND 12,498, SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES 
CONCERNING OIRA REVIEWS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 12,291 AND 12,498 
(June 13, 1986)). 
 17. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: 
The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1067-68 (1986). 
 18. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory 
Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1293-97 (1987). 
 19. See generally RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 189 (2008). 
 20. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995). 
 21. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
5
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B. Executive Order 12,866 
Although EO 12,866 preserved the status quo in that it 
continued to require centralized White House review of agency 
actions under a cost-benefit framework, it also reformed several 
specific features of this review that had proved troublesome.  
Taking on the issue of displacement, an early passage in EO 
12,866 “reaffirm[ed] the primacy of Federal agencies in the 
regulatory decision-making process.”22  At the same time, 
however, the order for the first time explicitly stated that if a 
conflict arose between OIRA and an agency over a particular 
matter that could not be resolved by the OMB Director and the 
agency head, it would be the President (or the Vice-President 
acting on the President’s behalf) who would settle the dispute – 
and make the “decision with respect to the matter.”23  EO 12,866 
also provided a specific framework for elevating decisions beyond 
OMB and the agency head: the Vice-President (then Al Gore) was 
to make recommendations to the President on how to resolve the 
conflict.24  EO 12,866 thus gestured toward the primacy of the 
agencies while simultaneously – for the first time in such an 
order – explicitly providing that the President would decide the 
hardest cases and laying out the process to follow when conflicts 
arose.25 
Addressing the problem of delay, EO 12,866 set out specific 
time limits on OIRA review.  Advance notices of proposed 
rulemaking, notices of inquiry, and “other preliminary regulatory 
actions prior to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” were to be 
reviewed within 10 days.26  Regulatory actions previously 
reviewed by OIRA were to be reviewed within 45 days if “there 
has been no material change in the facts and circumstances upon 
which the regulatory action is based.”27  “[A]ll other regulatory 
actions” were to be reviewed within 90 days.28  EO 12,866 also 
 
 22. Id. at 638. 
 23. Id. § 7. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2288-
90 (2001). 
 26. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(A), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
 27. Id. § 6(b)(2)(B). 
 28. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/5
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provided that the review process could be extended “(1) once by no 
more than 30 calendar days upon the written approval of the 
Director and (2) at the request of the agency head.”29  This 
provision allowing extensions seems, with its use of the word 
“and” rather than “or,” to contemplate a process whereby both the 
OMB Director and the agency head would need to agree on the 
extension. Together, the new deadlines, precisely defined and 
tailored to specific circumstances, were clearly designed to end 
OIRA review that dragged on intolerably long or even 
indefinitely. 
In addition, EO 12,866 limited the range of rules OIRA could 
review.  Only “significant” regulatory actions were to be 
reviewed.30 Economically significant actions – those having 
annual costs of $100 million or more31 – were to be accompanied 
by extensive cost-benefit analysis.32  Beyond annual costs, other 
features that might make a regulatory action significant (and 
thus subject to OIRA review) were serious inconsistencies with 
another agency’s plans,33 material effects on budgetary impacts of 
various programs,34 and the presence of “novel legal or policy 
issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or 
the principles set forth in this Executive order.”35  The OIRA 
Administrator was given the final say as to which regulatory 
actions qualify as significant and thus must be reviewed by 
OIRA.36 
EO 12,866 also took on the problem of OIRA acting as a 
conduit for industry views.  The order required disclosure of all 
contacts with outside parties during the period of OIRA review.37  
The order limited the conditions under which outside views could 
be relayed to OIRA by requiring that only the Administrator of 
OIRA or “a particular designee” could receive oral 
communications by persons outside the executive branch 
 
 29. Id. § 6(b)(2)(C). 
 30. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B). 
 31. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
 32. Id. § 6(a)(3)(C). 
 33. Id. § 3(f)(2). 
 34. Id. § 3(f)(3). 
 35. Id. § 3(f)(4). 
 36. Id. § 6(b)(3). 
 37. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(B)(iii), (C)(ii)-(iii), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
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regarding the substance of a regulatory action under review.38  
The order also provided that in the case of elevation to the 
President or Vice-President, any communications by outside 
parties, directed at the President’s advisors or their staffs or the 
staff of the Vice-President, would be in writing and would become 
part of the public docket.39  If the communication was not in 
writing, the advisors or staff members were to “inform the outside 
party that the matter is under review and that any comments 
should be submitted in writing.”40 
In other ways as well, EO 12,866 aimed to make OIRA 
review far more transparent than it had been.  In fact, the order 
requires transparency throughout the OIRA process.  If an 
agency plans a regulatory action that OIRA thinks is inconsistent 
with the President’s policies or priorities, OIRA must tell the 
agency so, in writing.41  If a regulatory action is under review, 
OIRA must provide information – in a “publicly available log” – 
about the status of that action.42  If a dispute arises between 
OIRA and an agency over whether a particular rule should issue, 
and one of these parties requests resolution of the dispute by the 
President or Vice-President, OIRA must note – in a “publicly 
available log” – who requested elevation and when.43  If OIRA 
returns a rule to an agency “for further consideration of some or 
all of its provisions,” the Administrator of OIRA must provide a 
“written explanation” for this return.44  If a regulatory proposal 
changes between the time it goes to OIRA and the time it 
emerges from OIRA, the agency must identify those changes (“in 
a complete, clear, and simple manner”).45  If OIRA insists on 
changes to the regulatory proposal during its review, the agency 
must identify those changes for the public (“in plain, 
understandable language”).46 
 
 38. Id. § 6(b)(4)(A). 
 39. Id. § 7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. § 4(c)(5). 
 42. Id. § 6(b)(4)(C)(i). 
 43. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(C)(i), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). 
 44. Id. § 6(b)(3). 
 45. Id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(ii). 
 46. Id. § 6(a)(3)(E)(iii). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/5
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If followed (an important qualification, as we will see), these 
disclosure requirements would allow the public to know, often in 
real time, what actions are under review at OIRA, what the 
status of those actions is, and what the consequences of the 
review have been for any particular agency action. 
A final refinement of EO 12,866 was the explicit inclusion, in 
the prescribed cost-benefit framework, of “qualitative measures of 
costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless 
essential to consider” and of benefits such as “distributive 
impacts . . . and equity” and “the enhancement of health and 
safety, the protection of the natural environment, and the 
elimination or reduction of discrimination or bias.”47 
Even with these changes, not everyone was thrilled with EO 
12,866. Some were disappointed that OIRA and cost-benefit 
analysis would continue to play a large role in determining 
regulatory policy.48  Others had long fretted that little would 
change if the culture – and personnel – at OIRA did not change.49  
Still others continued to worry about displacement of agency 
discretion; they thought that statutes giving authority and 
discretion to agencies did not allow the White House to direct the 
agencies to make particular decisions on particular matters.50 
Nevertheless, it seems fair to say – certainly in retrospect – 
that the Clinton years were relatively quiet ones for OIRA review.  
The process did not seem to involve the kinds of delays and 
secrecy prevalent in the Reagan-Bush years.51  The one known 
case of a high-level elevation of an issue to the President – 
involving EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards for 
particulate matter and ozone – resulted in a decision allowing the 
 
 47. Id. §§ 1(a), 6(a)(e)(C)(i) 
 48. Including this author: Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the 
Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2027-28 (1999). 
 49. Morrison, supra note 17 at 1067-68; Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of 
Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection 
Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 
1, 55-73 (1984). 
 50. Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for 
a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, 
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 967 (1997). 
 51. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: 
The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 996-98 (2001). 
9
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agency to proceed with the rules.52  While the OIRA process has 
never been free from controversy, the Clinton years were 
probably the least contentious.53 
The period of relative quiet did not last.  Upon assuming 
office in 2001, President George W. Bush, like his predecessors, 
sought to put his own stamp on regulatory policy through the 
OIRA process.  Interestingly, however, he did not do this by 
issuing a significant new executive order.  He did issue two 
executive orders on regulatory review, but they were (as these 
things go) relatively minor.  One, EO 13,258, replaced the Vice-
President-driven elevation process with a process staffed with the 
President’s “advisors.”54  Another, EO 13,422, strengthened 
language requiring agencies to find a market failure before 
regulating and also directed OIRA to review significant agency 
guidance (that is, agency statements of policy or interpretation 
that do not have the legal effect of rules).55  EO 13,422 generated 
criticism within the health, safety, and environmental community 
because of its tilt toward the superiority of private markets and 
its assertion of authority to review agency guidance.56  But EO 
12,866 also remained in place. 
Rather than prescribing a whole new framework for 
regulatory review, President Bush chose an intellectually forceful 
 
 52. John H. Cushman Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution 
Regulations Despite Concern Over Costs, N.Y. TIMES  (June 26, 1997), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/26/us/clinton-sharply-tightens-air-pollution-
regulations-despite-concern-over-costs.html. 
 53. See Steinzor, supra note 6 at 245-47 but see Lisa Schultz Bressman & 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the 
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006).  Note, however, 
that in their important article reporting on the views of the OIRA process from 
those inside the EPA during the Bush I and Clinton years, Lisa Schulz 
Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh did not find substantial differences in the 
responses of EPA personnel to questions about White House involvement in 
rulemaking during these different administrations.  Id.  
 54. Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204-206 (2002) (amending Exec. Order 
No. 12,866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 28, 
2002)). 
 55. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R.  191 (2007) (further amendment to Exec. 
Order No. 12,866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 
23, 2007). 
 56. See, e.g., OMB WATCH, A FAILURE TO GOVERN: BUSH’S ATTACK ON THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS (2007), available at 
http://dev.ombwatch.org/files/regs/PDFs/FailuretoGovern.pdf. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/5
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and politically shrewd academic, John Graham, to head OIRA.57  
One of Graham’s first acts as OIRA Administrator was to issue a 
memorandum on OIRA disclosure to OIRA staff. Acknowledging 
that transparency was essential to the legitimacy of the process,58 
Graham moved to increase transparency in several ways.  He 
directed that documents related to OIRA review be made 
available online.59  He required that notices of meetings and 
other communications with outside parties be made available 
online.60  He returned rules to agencies with a written and public 
explanation of why they were being returned.61  Each of these 
actions increased the public’s access to information about what 
happened when rules went to OIRA. 
Another of Graham’s innovations, however, turned in the 
opposite direction.  Graham began to insist that agencies involve 
OIRA early on in their deliberative processes.62  This early 
intervention ensured that rules would not arrive at OIRA fully 
baked, with little for OIRA to do but accept or reject them.  It also 
meant that many of OIRA’s early efforts would leave no public 
trail. The latter point requires a note of explanation.  OIRA has 
always, so far as I know, taken the position that only when a 
regulatory action is sent to OIRA through official channels – 
which now include a computer system used for the purpose of 
facilitating the transfer of rules between the agencies and OIRA – 
do the transparency requirements of EO 12,866 kick in.  If an 
agency briefs OIRA on a rule prior to formally sending it to OIRA, 
or consults with OIRA before doing so, or even sends a full-
 
 57. A sense of the reaction Dr. Graham’s appointment inspired in 
environmental circles can be found in Steve Weinberg, Mr. Bottom Line, 
ONEARTH (Spring 2003), available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/onearth/03spr/graham1.asp. 
 58. John D. Graham, OIRA Disclosure Memo-B, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET 
(Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_oira_disclosure_memo-
b. (“I believe that the transparency of OIRA's regulatory review process is 
critical to our ability to improve the nation's regulatory system. Only if it is clear 
how the OMB review process works and what it does will Congress and the 
public understand our role and the reasons behind our decisions.”). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See OIRA Return Letters, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 62. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of 
the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 972-74 (2005). 
11
HEINZERLING - FINAL- NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:23 AM 
336 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31 
 
fledged rule package to OIRA outside formal channels, none of 
this, or any of its consequences, will appear in the public record 
assembled for formal OIRA review.  Thus, Graham’s emphasis on 
early, informal intervention had the potential to significantly 
undermine the transparency achieved by his initiatives on 
disclosure. 
One episode from the Bush years, which occurred after 
Graham left office, well illustrates OIRA’s power to secretly alter 
an agency’s course.  Shortly after the Supreme Court held, in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,63 that the Clean Air Act empowers EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gases, President Bush held a press 
conference in the Rose Garden and directed EPA and the 
Department of Transportation to develop rules for cars that 
would comply with the Court’s decision.64  EPA would, at the 
same time, prepare a finding as to whether greenhouse gases 
endangered public health or welfare and thus triggered 
regulatory obligations under the Clean Air Act.65  The agencies 
went quickly to work, and within seven months EPA had 
prepared a draft endangerment finding, and the agencies 
together had prepared rules to regulate greenhouse gases from 
cars.  The agencies sent the rules to OIRA for review.66  Then 
things went off the rails. 
As I have mentioned, OIRA uses a computer system – known 
as “ROCIS” – to manage regulatory submissions from agencies.67  
When an agency sends an action to OIRA for review, it submits 
the package to ROCIS.68  From its end, OIRA then – in theory – 
uploads the package from ROCIS.  When OIRA uploads the 
package, it is accepted for review.  At that moment, the clock 
starts to tick on OIRA’s review, and the public disclosure 
 
 63. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 64. Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 2-3. 
 67. Even for Washington, the name of the system is exceptionally acronymic: 
the acronym “ROCIS” contains within it two additional acronyms.  “ROCIS” 
stands for “RISC” (Regulatory Information Service Center) and OIRA 
Consolidated Information System.” 
 68. OIRA Regulatory System, Records Management System and Records 
Management Center, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/gils_oira-gils (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
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requirements kick in.  If OIRA does not upload the package, 
however, it is as if it was never sent to OIRA; no clock begins 
ticking, and the package does not appear on OIRA’s website 
listing rules under review.  This is what happened to the draft 
endangerment finding and the proposed rules on cars: OIRA 
simply declined to upload them into ROCIS.  A presidential 
promise, months of work, compliance with a Supreme Court 
ruling – all went out the window with OIRA’s simple refusal to be 
in receiving mode when the agencies sent the package over to 
OIRA.69  The endangerment finding and the rules on cars 
languished at the agencies until the Obama administration came 
into office. 
The effect on EPA of OIRA’s declination of this regulatory 
package is hard to overstate.  EPA had become accustomed, 
through sheer necessity, to OIRA’s interventions in the 
rulemaking process.  But, so far as I know, OIRA had never 
before simply declined to accept a fully formed regulatory 
package.  Over a year later, by the time I arrived at EPA as the 
Administrator’s climate advisor, agency personnel were still 
reeling from OIRA’s action.  During my time at EPA, when OIRA 
would delay uploading a package to ROCIS for any reason, worry 
would spread through the offices involved with the package that 
perhaps OIRA would – as it had with the endangerment finding 
and the cars rules – just not upload the documents, and it would 
be as if they had never been sent, or indeed as if they had never 
been written. 
The refusal to open the documents on endangerment and cars 
caused a furor in the environmental community once it became 
known.70  It emerged as a primary example of how OIRA should 
 
 69. Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/washington/25epa.html?_r=0; Juliet 
Eilperin & R. Jeffrey Smith, EPA Won’t Act on Emissions This Year; Instead of 
New Rules, More Comment Sought, WASH. POST (July 11, 2008), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-07-11/news/36823556_1_greenhouse-
gas-clean-air-act-human-health-and-welfare.  As Eilperin and Smith report, it 
was not clear exactly who within the White House ordered that the regulatory 
package be declined.  Id. 
 70. Here is Jon Stewart’s hilarious take on the episode, The Daily Show with 
Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast June 25, 2008), available at:  
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not operate.71  To critics, the incident bespoke disrespect for 
agency process and even for the rule of law.  Many hoped such a 
thing would not happen again. 
The assertiveness and opacity of OIRA during the George W. 
Bush administration led many to hope that when Barack Obama 
came into office, things would change for the better.  And indeed, 
one of President Obama’s first acts was to issue an executive 
order revoking the Bush-era executive orders on regulatory 
review.72  As noted, the major substantive innovation of these 
orders was the assertion of OIRA authority to review agency 
guidance; thus, one of the major effects of the revocation of the 
Bush-era orders should have been to keep OIRA from reviewing 
agency guidance. 
But this was not to be.  In a little-noticed memorandum 
issued less than two months later, OIRA Director Peter Orszag 
essentially revoked President Obama’s revocation of the executive 
order on guidance.73  Orszag announced that OIRA would, despite 
Obama’s order, continue to review agency guidance, since it had 
done so for many years.74  The President’s revocation of the Bush-
era executive orders had received enthusiastic attention from 
progressive groups.75  Perhaps not surprisingly, the OMB 
Director’s memorandum revoking the major substantive part of 
 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/wed-june-25-2008/be-patient-this-gets-
amazing---epa-e-mail 
 71. White House Disses Supreme Court, Kills $2 Trillion Savings, 
CLIMATEPROGRESS, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2008/07/01/202838/white-
house-mocks-supreme-court-kills-2-trillion-savings/ (July 1, 2008) (also 
discussing OMB intervention in EPA’s later-issued Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking regarding greenhouse gases). 
 72. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. § 218 (2009) (revoking Executive Orders 
13,258 and 13,422 concerning Regulatory Planning and Review). 
 73. Memorandum from Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget Peter R. Orszag 
for the Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ 
memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Obama Begins Regulatory Reform, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T,  
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/9689 (Feb. 10, 2009); James Goodwin, 
Revoking EO 13422: An Important First Step Toward Fixing the Regulatory 
System, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Feb. 4, 2009), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/printPage.cfm?idBlog=417B6671-1E0B-E803-
CA4ED11FA8E0030C. 
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the President’s executive order – issued quietly, without a press 
release – received almost no attention.76  In fact, so stealthy was 
the replacement of Obama’s order with Orszag’s memorandum 
that, even months later, I found myself having to explain to EPA 
personnel why they still needed to send agency guidance to OIRA 
for review.  Quite understandably, they had read Barack Obama’s 
executive order rather than Peter Orszag’s interoffice 
memorandum. 
In another gesture of potential change, in January 2009 
President Obama also issued a presidential memorandum 
directing the Director of OMB to consult with representatives of 
regulatory agencies and to make recommendations to the 
President for a new executive order on regulatory review.77  The 
memorandum noted that much had been learned since 1993, 
when EO 12,866 was issued, about both the substance of 
regulation (“what works and what does not”) and about “how to 
improve the process of regulatory review.”78  “In this time of 
fundamental transformation,” President Obama declared, “that 
process – and the principles governing regulation in general – 
should be revisited.”79  The President also laid out specific topics 
he wanted covered in OMB’s recommendations: 
[T]he recommendations should offer suggestions for the 
relationship between OIRA and the agencies; provide guidance 
on disclosure and transparency; encourage public participation in 
agency regulatory processes; offer suggestions on the role of cost-
benefit analysis; address the role of distributional considerations, 
fairness, and concern for the interests of future generations; 
identify methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not 
produce undue delay; clarify the role of the behavioral sciences in 
 
 76. No press statement appears on the White House website devoted to such 
items: Statements and Releases, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefing-room/Statements-and-Releases/2009/03 (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
 77. Presidential Memorandum of January 30, 2009: Regulatory Review, 74 
Fed. Reg. 5977 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO 
/fedRegReview/POTUS_Memo_on_Regulatory_Review.pdf. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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formulating regulatory policy; and identify the best tools for 
achieving public goals through the regulatory process.80 
President Obama directed OMB to produce the 
recommendations within 100 days.81  The President also directed 
OMB to consult with the representatives of regulatory agencies, 
“as appropriate,” in formulating recommendations for a new 
executive order.82  From my time at EPA, I know that agencies 
did indeed submit comments to OMB.  Notably, OMB never made 
the agencies’ comments public; thus we do not know what the 
agencies said to OMB about regulatory review and how to 
improve the process.  OMB also asked the public for comments on 
regulatory review and how to reform it.83  Public comments (183 
of them)84 came in by the end of March 2009.85 
And there the matter sat.  Agency personnel, buoyed by the 
possibility of reform of a secretive, intrusive, and time-consuming 
process, eagerly anticipated the new executive order.  Outside 
groups interested in health, safety, and environmental protection 
cheered the prospect of changes to a system that had worked 
disproportionately against rules in their domain. But nothing 
happened for almost two years, and, in that time, OIRA 
continued to assert its customary control over agency regulatory 
decisions. 
C. Executive Order 13,563 
In January 2011, a new executive order on regulatory review 
finally emerged.86  The single most notable fact about the new 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Federal Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009) (inviting 
public comment on how to improve the process of regulatory review and 
principles governing regulation). 
 84. Steinzor, supra note 6 at 255-56. 
 85. Federal Regulatory Review, Extension of request for comments, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 11,383 (Mar. 17, 2009) (extending public comment period to March 31, 
2009).  A summary of the comments from 170 different individuals and 
organizations can be found at: Comments on New Regulatory Order Pour into 
OMB, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/9913 (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
 86. Exec. Order. No.  13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
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order, EO 13,563, is how not-new it was; much of the order simply 
repeats, verbatim, the language of EO 12,866. 
Another striking fact about the order is how weakly 
responsive it is to President Obama’s own directives in his 
presidential memorandum of January 2009: EO 13,563 does not 
say a word about “the relationship between OIRA and the 
agencies” or “methods of ensuring that regulatory review does not 
produce undue delay.”  On “disclosure and transparency,” the 
order says nothing about disclosure and transparency related to 
OIRA, but focuses only on the agencies and here simply advises 
them to place materials online and in an open format wherever 
possible.87  On “public participation in agency regulatory 
processes,” the order advises the agencies to seek out the public’s 
views prior to proposing rules (something agencies already 
routinely did).88  On “the role of cost-benefit analysis,” the order 
adds nothing to EO 12,866 except for a new allowance for “human 
dignity” in the calculations of regulatory benefits.89  As for “the 
role of distributional considerations, fairness, and concern for the 
interests of future generations,” the order adds only the word 
“fairness” to EO 12,866’s already-existing references to 
distributive impacts and equity.90  And as for clarifying “the role 
of the behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory policy” and 
identifying “the best tools for achieving public goals through the 
regulatory process,” the only new item in the new executive order 
was a reference to “appropriate default rules.”91 
President Obama’s new executive order on regulatory review, 
in short, was neither very new nor very specific.  Any hope that 
President Obama would use the new executive order as an 
occasion to fundamentally reshape the relationship between the 
White House and the agencies, or to loosen the grip of cost-benefit 
analysis on regulatory policy, was dashed.  Yet the very 
vagueness of the executive order also created a large space within 
which OIRA could fashion a kind of common law of regulatory 
review.  OIRA eagerly inhabited that space. 
 
 87. Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 213 (2011). 
 88. Id. § 2(c). 
 89. Id. § 1(c). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. § 4. 
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 II. THE COMMON LAW OF EXECUTIVE             
ORDER 13,563 
The common law of EO 13,563 determines the most 
important features of the current process of regulatory review: 
who is the decision maker, what is reviewed, why particular 
actions fail regulatory review, when actions emerge from review, 
and what is disclosed about the process.  If one has read EOs 
12,866 and 13,563, which in theory govern this process, surprises 
are in store once we look at the way the process actually operates. 
A. Who Decides? 
Recall that EO 12,866 puts OIRA initially in charge of the 
process of regulatory review.  But if, according to EO 12,866, a 
dispute arises between OIRA and the action agency, the dispute 
is to be resolved through a highly specified process that involves 
recommendations from the Vice-President and an ultimate 
decision by the President or by the Vice-President acting on his 
behalf.92 
This is not how regulatory review works today.  In my two 
years at EPA, I do not recall ever hearing of Vice-Presidential 
involvement in a regulatory matter.  Moreover, the OIRA process 
in the Obama administration was not structured to funnel 
disputes between OIRA and the agencies to Vice-President Biden 
for his recommendations.  It was far messier and more ill-defined 
than that.  From my perspective, it was often hard to tell who 
exactly was in charge of making the ultimate decision on an 
important regulatory matter. 
A recent account of the OIRA process by former OIRA 
Administrator Cass Sunstein helps to explain this confusion as to 
some regulatory matters, but leaves a puzzle as to others.93  
Sunstein states that OIRA’s primary role in the regulatory 
process is as an “information-aggregator” – compiling information 
from many actors in the executive branch and using that 
 
 92. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 7, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). Recall that the Bush-
era executive order replacing the role of the Vice-President with that of 
presidential “advisors” was revoked by President Obama during his first days in 
office. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. § 218 (2009). 
 93. See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5. 
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information to help get at the right regulatory result.94  
Observing that the White House is a “they,” not an “it,”95 
Sunstein emphasizes the role of other White House offices and 
officials, beyond OIRA, in shaping regulatory policy.96  Sunstein 
lists almost a dozen White House offices that, he says, play a 
significant role.97  Beyond the White House, Sunstein asserts that 
agencies other than the agency proposing a particular regulatory 
action also have a large influence on regulatory policy.98  
Sometimes it is another Cabinet secretary who might have such 
influence;99 often, Sunstein says, it is career staff at another 
agency.100  Sometimes it is the Chief of Staff of the White House 
who plays the major role;101 sometimes it is a member of 
Congress.102  Sunstein extols the virtues of this system, arguing 
that the aggregation of input from all of these different sources 
produces better regulatory results.103  Of course, Sunstein’s 
description also explains why it was often hard, from EPA’s 
perspective, to know who was calling the shots; perhaps it was 
Rahm Emanuel, the White House Chief of Staff from 2009 to 
2010, or perhaps it was Tom Vilsack, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, or perhaps it was a career staffer at the Department 
of Energy.  The confusion was deepened by OIRA’s insistence 
that, once a matter was under review, all communications run 
through OIRA.104  At one point in my tenure at EPA, it was even 
suggested that a conversation between members of the 
President’s Cabinet on a matter under review would be 
inappropriate if OIRA were not included. 
Sunstein’s account of the OIRA process at least helps me to 
understand why we were all so confused about exactly what the 
process was. 
 
 94. Id. at 1838, 1840, 1844, 1875. 
 95. Id. at 1840, 1854, 1858. 
 96. Id. at 1845, 1849, 1854, 1856, 1857, 1865, 1870-71. 
 97. Id. at 1855. 
 98. Id. at 1840-43, 1847, 1854, 1869. 
 99. See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1851-52, 1858. 
 100. Id. at 1941-43. 
 101. Id. at 1856, 1871. 
 102. Id. at 1852, 1858. 
 103. Id. at 1840-41, 1843, 1869-72. 
 104. Id. at 1859. 
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In another respect, though, Sunstein’s account in the 
Harvard Law Review is puzzling rather than clarifying.  From my 
vantage point at EPA, it certainly often appeared that OIRA – not 
other White House offices, not other agencies – was calling the 
shots.  OIRA decided what to review, offered line-by-line edits of 
regulatory proposals, convened meetings with outside parties, 
mediated disputes among the agencies, decided whether an 
agency’s cost-benefit analysis was up to snuff, and more.  It often 
appeared, from the agency’s perspective, that other White House 
offices were brought in to bolster, not to question, OIRA’s position 
on regulatory matters.105  I was not in the White House, and so I 
cannot confirm that the latter impression was correct.  But I can 
say that Sunstein’s account does not jibe with my own 
perceptions of OIRA’s power relative to EPA or to other executive 
branch actors. 
In his new book on his time in the government, however, 
Sunstein paints a somewhat different picture of the role of OIRA 
during his tenure.  Sunstein’s book, “Simpler: The Future of 
Government,” makes clear just how much power he wielded as 
the Administrator of OIRA.  Referring to OIRA as “the cockpit of 
the regulatory state,”106 Sunstein informs us that, as OIRA 
Administrator, he had the power to “say no to members of the 
president’s Cabinet”;107 to deposit “highly touted rules, beloved by 
regulators, onto the shit list”;108 to make sure that some rules 
“never saw the light of day”;109 to impose cost-benefit analysis 
“wherever the law allowed”;110 and to transform cost-benefit 
analysis from an analytical tool into a “rule of decision,” meaning 
that “[a]gencies could not go forward” if their rules flunked 
OIRA’s cost-benefit test.111  This account – in which OIRA plays a 
central and often decisive role in determining which rules move 
and which don’t – is much more consistent with my own 
 
 105. This impression is consistent with EPA officials’ accounts of White House 
involvement in rulemaking during the Bush I and Clinton years.  Bressman & 
Vandenbergh, supra note 53, at 68-69. 
 106. See SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 3. 
 107. See id. at 3. 
 108. See id. at 6. 
 109. See id  at 7. 
 110. See id. at 8. 
 111. See id. at 161. 
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experience at EPA than is Sunstein’s account of OIRA as a kind 
of neutral “information-aggregator.”112 
Beyond Sunstein’s account, the relative power of EPA within 
the OIRA process is also well illustrated by considering the 
increase in influence that EPA personnel enjoy when they go on 
detail to offices within the White House.  Many White House 
offices depend on agency detailees to help do their work.  The 
Council of Economic Advisors and the Council on Environmental 
Quality nearly always have one or more detailees from EPA. 
These detailees, in my experience, participate actively in the 
OIRA process – and, often, not by pressing for EPA’s rules but 
instead by offering critiques of EPA’s work.  The detailees appear 
to have far more power when they are housed in a White House 
office than they do at EPA, often because their expertise – 
frequently it is economics – is more central to the White House 
process than it is to EPA’s regulatory frameworks.  Going on 
detail to the White House increases the power of EPA personnel 
not because they somehow become more expert when they go to 
the White House, but because the White House privileges their 
particular expertise over other kinds of expertise.  Going on detail 
to the White House also increases the power of agency personnel 
for another, very simple reason: the White House has the final 
say on agency rules. 
The role of agency detailees in the OIRA process makes it 
hard to make sense of Sunstein’s portrait of OIRA as an 
“information-aggregator.”  If, as I have said, an appreciable 
number of the people doing the work in the White House are 
actually employees on detail from the agencies whose work is 
being reviewed, what sense does it make to say that the OIRA 
review process increases the total amount of information 
gathered during a rulemaking process or that it increases the 
likelihood that a rule will get it right?  The same agency 
personnel participating in the White House process have virtually 
identical counterparts, making the same kinds of observations, in 
their home agencies; yet these personnel have a power in the 
White House that they do not enjoy in their home agencies.  More 
than an information-aggregator, then, OIRA is an information-
 
 112. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1838. 
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sorter; economic information rises to the top, other information 
shakes out below. 
Also relevant to the question of who is calling the shots in the 
OIRA process is the kind of rules OIRA reviews.  Most of the 
rules OIRA reviews are not economically significant;113 that is, 
they do not pass EO 12,866’s economic-significance threshold of 
$100 million in annual costs.114  Many of the rules do not have 
obvious interagency dimensions.  Many are continuing iterations 
of longstanding regulatory programs. In these cases, when the 
rules got into trouble in the OIRA process, it often did not appear 
that there was any appreciable interagency pushback on the rules 
or any White House resistance outside OIRA.  Often, indeed, it 
appeared that OIRA career staff simply trumped EPA career staff 
when it came to rules that were neither insignificant enough, 
from OIRA’s perspective, to pass up the opportunity for review, 
nor significant enough, from EPA’s perspective, to elevate the 
issue beyond OIRA.115 
In these ways, the “common law” of regulatory review under 
President Obama manages to muddy the seemingly simple 
question: who runs EPA?  Long gone, it appears, is the carefully 
articulated power structure of EO 12,866, with its process for 
elevating issues and for deciding them once elevated.  In its place, 
a free-for-all of regulatory power has emerged, with no one clearly 
in charge.  The lack of a clear power structure is, perhaps 
unintentionally, best captured by Sunstein’s incongruent 
accounts of his own role in the process: was he the regulatory 
czar, or an information-aggregator?  It depends on which account 
you read. 
 
 113. From January 20, 2009, to April 8, 2013, OIRA reviewed a total of 2514 
regulatory actions, of which only 477 were economically significant.  Review 
Counts, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/ 
public/do/eoCountsSearch (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).  For EPA, the numbers 
were 340 total rules, 66 of which were economically significant.  Id. 
 114. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
 115. For a similar account of the Bush I and Clinton years, see Bressman & 
Vandenbergh, supra note 53. 
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B. What Is Reviewed? 
One domain in which OIRA’s powerful role is quite clear, 
however, is in the decisions about which regulatory actions OIRA 
will review.  EO 12,866 states that OIRA may review not only 
economically significant actions, but also actions with a 
significant potential for interagency conflict or inconsistency and 
actions that raise “novel legal or policy issues.”116  In fact, most of 
the rules OIRA reviews are not economically significant.  In the 
Obama administration so far, some 80 percent of the EPA rules 
that have been reviewed were not economically significant.117  
Moreover, many of the rules under review lack any obvious 
interagency dimension.  So how does OIRA come to review them? 
While I was at EPA, we had a routinized process for 
determining what went to OIRA.  Every three months or so, the 
Assistant Administrators of the program offices (air, water, solid 
waste and emergency response, chemical safety and pollution 
prevention) and I met with representatives from OIRA to go over 
the regulatory actions EPA planned to announce in the coming 
months.  We offered our own opinion as to whether any given 
item warranted OIRA review.  But the bottom line was that it 
was not our decision to make.  If OIRA wanted to review 
something, OIRA reviewed it.118  Sometimes, the reason for 
review was a little baffling, along the lines of: we’ve always 
reviewed this kind of action, so we’d like to review this one, too.  
The explanation was baffling because the longstanding practice of 
review sometimes came straight from a prior administration with 
seemingly different perspectives on the role of regulation and 
government; the same OIRA career personnel who had “always” 
reviewed those kinds of actions were insisting that they should 
still review them, even after a change in personnel at the very top 
– and even though, strangely, they were often asserting such 
power of review under the EO provision that covered “novel” legal 
or policy issues.119  On occasion, EPA was able to persuade OIRA 
 
 116. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(4), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
 117. Numbers are available from the OIRA website.  Executive Order Review 
Counts Results, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/ 
public/do/eoCountsSearch (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
 118. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(2)(B), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
 119. Id. § 3(f)(4). 
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not to review a regulatory action that OIRA was inclined to 
review; but this was the exception, not the rule. 
It is thus quite perplexing to read recent accounts of the 
OIRA process that argue that agencies can avoid OIRA review 
altogether through quite obvious and simple stratagems.120  
Agencies can, it is argued, separate regulatory actions into 
different packages so that no one action is economically 
significant;121 they can low-ball their estimates of regulatory 
costs to come in under the threshold for economic significance;122 
they can slip a policy out as guidance rather than as a rule;123 
they can do low-quality cost-benefit analysis to make OIRA 
review more difficult;124 they can even, we are told, spring a rule 
on the world without warning to OIRA.125 
From the perspective of EPA, at least, this is not a plausible 
account.  Most of the EPA rules OIRA reviews are not 
economically significant, so fussing around to make a rule or 
package of rules not economically significant won’t help to avoid 
OIRA review.  OIRA, in any event, lavishes skeptical attention on 
EPA’s estimates of regulatory costs.  Moreover, as discussed 
above, OIRA continues to review agency guidance,126 so 
denominating an action as guidance will not avoid OIRA review.  
And in my experience, OIRA personnel keep an eagle eye on EPA 
– on its public announcements, website, etc. – to make sure EPA 
does not sneak something past it.  From OIRA’s perspective, the 
system appears to work: EPA receives more sustained attention 
from OIRA than any other federal agency.  Most often, EPA is the 
agency with the largest number of rules under review at OIRA.127 
 
 120. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1755 (2013); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994 (2011). 
 121. Nou, supra note 120 at 36. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 28-32. 
 124. Id. at 37-40. 
 125. OIRA Avoidance, supra note 120, at 1005. 
 126. See Memorandum from Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. & Budget Peter R. 
Orszag for the Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 4, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ 
memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf. 
 127. Lists of rules under formal review at OIRA can be found online.  OFFICE 
OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov (last visited Oct. 22 
2013). 
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On the issue of which regulatory actions go to OIRA, 
therefore, the express terms of EO 12,866 again recede and a 
common law emerges.  OIRA reviews pretty much anything it 
wants to review and fits anything it must into the catch-all 
category, “novel legal or policy issues.” 
C. Why Do Rules Fail? 
One of the most vexing questions concerning regulatory 
review has to do with the basis on which regulatory actions fail 
this review.  When a regulatory action goes to OIRA for review, it 
goes fully formed, reflecting the agency’s best judgment about the 
proper path in the relevant circumstances.  EPA rules go to OIRA 
after an extensive period of internal development and review.128  
In many cases, the rules have been under development for years, 
with dozens or more agency personnel working on them.  In the 
case of the most significant rules, they have gone to the 
Administrator herself for initial selection of options and later for 
final review.129  It is a matter of some consequence, then, when 
OIRA does not allow such rules to issue, or requires substantial 
changes before they may issue. 
One reason why OIRA might disapprove of an agency’s 
planned action is that it disagrees with the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute the agency is charged with 
administering.  Notably, neither EO 12,866 nor EO 13,563 gives 
OIRA the authority to second-guess agencies’ interpretations of 
the statutes they administer.  Indeed, both executive orders 
explicitly state that nothing in them permits a departure from 
 
 128. EPA has a robust internal process for developing rules.  EPA OFFICE OF 
POLICY, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: GUIDANCE FOR EPA STAFF ON 
DEVELOPING QUALITY ACTIONS (2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/ 
sabproduct.nsf/5088B3878A90053E8525788E005EC8D8/$File/adp03-00-11.pdf. 
 129. EPA’s Action Development Process specifies the criteria for determining 
which regulatory actions are “Tier 1” rules and thus must receive substantial 
input from the Administrator at important stages in the rulemaking process.  
EPA, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS GUIDANCE FOR EPA STAFF ON 
DEVELOPING QUALITY ACTIONS 22-27 (2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
sab/sabproduct.nsf/5088B3878A90053E8525788E005EC8D8/$File/adp03-00-
11.pdf. 
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existing law.130  Yet, in a post-Chevron world, that disclaimer 
means less than it seems.131  If a statute is ambiguous – or if 
OIRA believes that a statute is ambiguous – then perhaps OIRA 
has room to press an agency to change its interpretation of a 
statute it administers, without running afoul of the EOs’ 
injunction to follow existing law.  After Chevron, “existing law” is 
up for grabs so long as existing law is ambiguous. 
President Obama’s OIRA has aggressively moved into the 
space created by Chevron.  As a law professor, Cass Sunstein had 
promoted “cost-benefit default principles,” according to which 
statutes are interpreted to allow cost-benefit analysis so long as 
they do not clearly forbid it;132 as OIRA Administrator, Sunstein 
moved to lock these default principles into place.133  With respect 
to EPA rules, OIRA actively pressed EPA to interpret its 
governing statutes to allow cost-benefit analysis, even where EPA 
had a long history of interpreting them not to allow it.  Pressure 
like this appears to have borne public fruit when EPA announced 
its long-awaited proposal for addressing the ecological impacts of 
cooling water intake structures under the Clean Water Act.134  In 
its preamble discussing the rule, EPA noted that it was adopting 
an interpretation of the relevant provision of the Clean Water Act 
that would allow cost-benefit analysis, citing EO 13,563 as 
authority for this interpretation.135 
I have argued elsewhere that agencies should not get 
deference under Chevron when an interpretation is foist upon 
them by OIRA; OIRA is not charged by Congress with 
interpreting the statutes the agencies administer, and OIRA does 
 
 130. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 9, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563 
§ 7(b)(i), (c), 3 C.F.R. § 213 (2011). 
 131. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 132. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 
(2001). 
 133. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 8 . 
 134. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System – Cooling Water Intake 
Structures at Existing Facilities and Phase I Facilities, Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 22173, 22185, 22196, 22207, 22212 (Apr. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 122 and 125). 
 135. Id. 
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not have the expertise of the relevant agencies.136  But whatever 
one thinks about the legal consequences of an OIRA-driven 
agency interpretation, one must take note of the large degree of 
influence wielded by OIRA when one of the powers it asserts is to 
embed cost-benefit default principles into the regulatory process. 
To understand the boldness of OIRA’s power grab, it helps to 
consider a bit of history.  In 1994, eyeing the first Republican 
takeover of the House of Representatives in forty years, Newt 
Gingrich proposed an aggressive series of legislative reforms, 
bundled together as the “Contract With America.”137  Among the 
most contentious of the proposals was the “supermandate”: a 
requirement that all rules protecting human health, safety, or the 
environment pass a cost-benefit test.138  Critics of what President 
Bill Clinton dubbed the “Contract On America”139 feared that 
applying a cost-benefit test to health, safety, and environmental 
rules would often spell their doom, as these rules produce benefits 
— in human health, in longer life, in cleaner air and water and 
land — that are hard to quantify and even harder to monetize.140  
President Clinton vetoed bills to fund the government in part 
because they contained the supermandate,141 leading to the 
government shutdowns of 1995 and likely contributing to 
Clinton’s political renewal. 
Thanks to Sunstein, though, the supermandate is back.  By 
pressing agencies to adopt cost-benefit analysis as a decision-
making framework wherever the law allows it, Sunstein’s OIRA 
has, by executive fiat rather than legislative enactment, imposed 
a cost-benefit supermandate wherever the law is ambiguous 
(which, of course, it often is).  Presumably, then, one way that 
 
 136. Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2006). 
 137. See, e.g., Katherine Q. Seelye, The 1994 Campaign: The Republicans; 
With Fiery Words, Gingrich Builds His Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at 
A1. 
 138. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The APA at Fifty: The Expanded Debate 
Over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1494 (1996). 
 139. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, The Clinton Record: Congress; The President and 
Congress: A Partnership of Self-Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at A1. 
 140. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Says G.O.P. Rule Cutting Would Cost 
Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A14. 
 141. See, e.g., R.W. Apple Jr., Battle Over the Budget: News Analysis; In This 
Fight, Polls Guide All the Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at A1. 
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rules can fail the OIRA process is if they do not hew to OIRA’s 
new supermandate. 
Another way rules can fail the OIRA review process is to fail 
cost-benefit analysis.  One way to fail is never to try.  An 
important but little-remarked aspect of the relationship between 
EPA and OIRA is that OIRA’s fine cost-benefit sieve leads EPA 
personnel to be deeply wary of developing rules that have very 
high costs in relation to their quantified and monetized benefits.  
Indeed, Sunstein himself suggests this may be one consequence of 
OIRA’s cost-benefit test.142  From the moment EPA begins even 
to think about proposing a rule that OIRA will likely want to see, 
EPA personnel wonder whether OIRA will accept it; this mindset 
narrows the range of rules EPA might otherwise consider. 
If EPA does decide to propose a rule that has much higher 
costs than benefits, that rule may not make it past OIRA.  Among 
environmental rules, non-air rules fare the worst in a cost-benefit 
framework.  Rules governing air pollution often produce 
relatively (or even very) high benefits in relation to costs on 
account of reductions in particulate matter.  Indeed, according to 
OMB, in the last decade clean air rules have produced a majority 
of the total monetized benefits conferred by all of the major 
regulations in the federal government.143  Rules on water 
pollution, toxics, and hazardous waste contamination do not have 
a single category of benefits – like reductions in human mortality 
due to reductions in particulate matter – that makes it possible 
for them to clear the cost-benefit hurdle.  These programs fare 
poorly in OIRA’s process of review.  EPA’s proposal to regulate 
coal ash changed markedly while at OIRA, and has not seen the 
light of day since it was proposed.144  EPA initiatives on toxics 
have stalled at OIRA for years.145  Likewise, rules on water 
 
 142. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1863. 
 143. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON 
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES, 15 (2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/draft_2012_cost_benefit_r
eport.pdf. 
 144. White House Misadventures in Coal Ash Rule, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T 
(May 18, 2010), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11001. 
 145. See Executive Order Submissions Under Review, OFFICE OF INFO. & 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS,  (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 
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pollution appear permanently stuck.146  While Sunstein reports 
that cost-benefit analysis is not a major reason why rules get 
stuck at OIRA,147 it is hard to escape speculating that cost-benefit 
analysis must be one factor in the trouble these categories of 
rules have run into at OIRA.  Indeed, Sunstein also says that 
rules that fail cost-benefit will in fact likely fail OIRA review. 148 
Sunstein asserts that EO 13,563 adds qualitative texture to 
the generally quantitative thrust of cost-benefit analysis.149  In 
particular, he notes, EO 13,563 introduced “dignity” into the cost-
benefit equation.150  Sunstein cites the Department of Justice’s 
rule on prison rape as an instance in which “dignity” made a 
difference in the regulatory process.151  In its cost-benefit analysis 
of its rule aiming to reduce the incidence of prison rape, DOJ 
noted that it was very hard to quantify and monetize the benefits 
of reducing rape.152  Nevertheless, DOJ said, reducing rape would 
promote human dignity, and this was a positive feature of its rule 
on prison rape.153 
But I would venture to guess that the only reason DOJ was 
doing a cost-benefit analysis of rape prevention was that OIRA 
insisted on it.  The only reason DOJ needed to reach to justify 
preventing rape was that OIRA’s cost-benefit vision did not easily 
digest, in economic terms, a human indignity like rape.154  To 
argue, as Sunstein does, that the inclusion of “dignity” in EO 
13,563 somehow made it possible to issue DOJ’s rule on prison 
rape is to get things very backwards. 
 
eoReviewSearch (showing chemicals rules that have been at OIRA for one to 
three years). 
 146. See id. (showing water rules that have been at OIRA for over a year). 
 147. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1868-69. 
 148. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 161. 
 149. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1865. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT, REGULATORY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINAL RULE 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_ria.pdf. 
 153. Id. at 5. 
 154. Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark, GEO.  L. FACULTY BLOG 
(June 13, 2012), http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/2012/06/ 
cost-benefit-jumps-the-shark.html. 
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One of the most problematic features of cost-benefit analysis, 
especially for future-oriented regulatory programs like those 
involving the environment, is its treatment of future 
consequences.  In calling for recommendations on a new executive 
order, President Obama explicitly asked the OMB Director to 
address “concern for the interests of future generations.”155  This 
concern did not make it into the actual executive order, and 
indeed, the record of the Obama administration has been 
disappointing in this domain.  The Obama administration’s 
signature effort in this area – the estimation of the “social cost of 
carbon”156 – used higher discount rates than OIRA’s own cost-
benefit guidance to agencies allows when a regulatory policy has 
significant intergenerational effects.  The Obama administration 
approved a “central” value for the discount rate to be used in 
calculating the social cost of carbon of 3 percent and a upper 
value of 5 percent157 – yet OIRA’s own guidance allows agencies 
to use discount rates of 1 to 3 percent where intergenerational 
effects are significant.158  Increasing the discount rate means 
decreasing the worth of future generations.159  In approving a 
high range of discount rates for climate consequences, the Obama 
administration took a step backward, not forward, in the 
incorporation of future generations’ interests in cost-benefit 
analysis. 
We have seen that rules might fail OIRA review because they 
do not have a positive enough cost-benefit profile, and that 
President Obama’s executive order on regulatory review has not 
appreciably helped rules get over this hurdle.  Another reason 
why rules might fail OIRA review is that they simply fail “on the 
merits.”  This is, in fact, Sunstein’s explanation of why EPA’s 
 
 155. Presidential Memorandum of January 30, 2009, Regulatory Review, 74 
Fed. Reg. 21, 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-regulatory-review. 
 156. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COSTS OF CARBON, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf. 
 157. Id. at 3. 
 158. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/. 
 159. See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 
39 (1999). 
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final rule revising the ozone standard failed: the decision to 
return the rule to EPA was, Sunstein asserts, “unquestionably 
correct”160 and “made on the merits.”161  He does not explain 
what this means – on the merits, considering cost-benefit 
analysis? on the merits, considering the scientific evidence? on 
the merits, considering EPA’s other priorities and activities? – 
but he does insist that the rejection of EPA’s rule on ozone was 
“not motivated by politics.”162 
Whatever view Sunstein takes of the “merits” of the ozone 
rule, it is hard to understand why the President rejected it and 
why Sunstein thinks that decision was “unquestionably correct.”  
If, by the “merits,” Sunstein means that the rule failed a cost-
benefit test, that claim would be legally irrelevant.  Neither EPA 
nor the White House was allowed to use cost-benefit analysis to 
pass judgment on the rule: the Supreme Court has held 
(unanimously) that EPA may not consider costs in setting the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards.163  The President’s 
letter to Administrator Jackson emphasized “regulatory burdens,” 
“regulatory uncertainty,” and the economic downturn in 
explaining the return of the rule to EPA;164 if these 
considerations were indeed the basis for the President’s decision, 
the decision was unlawful. 
Perhaps Sunstein means that the ozone rule failed on the 
scientific merits.  Certainly, OIRA has played an active role in 
adjusting EPA’s discussions of technical matters in its NAAQS 
decisions.  In a report prepared for the Administrative Conference 
of the United States, Professor Wendy Wagner has carefully 
documented just how often OIRA intrudes upon EPA’s technical 
 
 160. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 5, at 7. 
 161. Id. at 27. 
 162. Id.  For a very different take on this episode, see John M. Broder, Re-
election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on Smog, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011). 
 163. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001). 
 164. Press Release, Statement by the President on the Ozone National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Statement by the 
President on Ozone], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/02/ statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-
standards. 
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analysis in the domain of the NAAQS.165  But OIRA does not 
have the scientific expertise necessary to make judgments about 
where the NAAQS should be set.  Nor, it should be added, does 
the President.  Moreover, the scientific shakiness of the decision 
to direct EPA to withdraw the ozone standard emerged clearly at 
oral argument on the EPA standard left in place by President 
Obama’s decision.  At argument, the panel of D.C. Circuit judges 
sharply questioned the government’s lawyers as to the scientific 
merits of the Bush-era ozone standard, left standing after EPA 
withdrew its revised standard.166  They seemed very skeptical 
that the Bush-era standard was stringent enough.167  Given the 
lack of relevant expertise on the part of OIRA and the President, 
and given the hard time EPA had defending the Bush-era 
standard in court, it is hard to imagine that when Sunstein says 
Obama’s decision to reject EPA’s revised standard was correct “on 
the merits,” Sunstein means that the directive to withdraw the 
revised standard was “unquestionably correct” as a matter of 
science. 
A final possibility is that Sunstein believes that the ozone 
decision was correct on the merits because it reflected good 
governance.  The President’s letter to Administrator Jackson 
emphasized the importance of regulatory certainty and observed 
that EPA was already in the process of reviewing the ozone 
standard in light of the very latest scientific evidence.168  So 
perhaps Sunstein means that the decision to reject the standard 
was correct because EPA should just have waited for the new 
five-year review of the ozone standard, rather than reconsidering 
the Bush-era standard and replacing it with a revised standard 
based on the same evidence EPA had considered in the Bush 
administration. 
 
 165. Wendy Wagner, Science in Regulation: A Study of Agency Decisionmaking 
Approaches (Feb. 18, 2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf. 
 166. See Robin Bravender, Obama Ozone Decision Blindsides Enviros – and 
His Own EPA, POLITICO, (Sept. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.politico.com/news/ stories/0911/62586.html. 
 167. See Lawrence Hurley, Court Sympathetic to Enviros’ Challenge to Bush-
era Ozone Standards, GREENWIRE (Nov. 16, 2012), available at http://eenews.net/ 
public/Greenwire/2012/11/16/2. However, the court went on to uphold the Bush-
era standard, in Mississippi v. EPA, 723 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 168. See Statement by the President on Ozone, supra note 164. 
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The trouble with this potential explanation is that, by the 
time President Obama ordered the standard pulled, EPA had 
been working on the reconsidered ozone standard for 2-1/2 years, 
with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the White House. 
Work on the reconsidered standard was consistent with Rahm 
Emanuel’s memorandum to agencies, written within a week of 
President Obama’s inauguration, directing them to review new 
and pending regulatory actions begun in the Bush 
administration, 169 and with the President’s own March 2009 
memorandum on scientific integrity.170  The Bush-era ozone 
standard was widely regarded as one of the biggest 
environmental defaults of the Bush administration relating to the 
environment; many thought the standard of 0.075 parts per 
million was scientifically unsound.  Thus, in September 2009, 
EPA announced that it would reconsider the Bush-era ozone 
standard.171  In January 2010, EPA proposed revising that 
standard.172  EPA held three public hearings and took public 
comment on the proposed standard in 2010.173  The proposal went 
through OIRA.174  The upper end of the range the agency 
proposed to consider was 0.070 parts per million of ozone.175  In 
other words, no part of the range EPA proposed for the revision 
encompassed the Bush-era standard. 
 
 169. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938, 
2943 (Jan. 19, 2010); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 170. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938, 
2943 (Jan. 19, 2010); Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies on Scientific Integrity (Mar. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads-executive-
departments-and-agencies-3-9-09. 
 171. Fact Sheet: EPA to Reconsider Ozone Pollution Standards, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/glo/pdfs/O3_Reconsideration_FACT%20SHEET_091609.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
 172. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938 
(Jan. 19, 2010). 
 173. EPA, Regulatory Actions: Ozone Standards, http://www.epa.gov/glo/ 
actions.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2013). 
 174. Executive Order Reviews Completed Between Jan 1, 2010 to Dec. 31, 2010, 
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 
eoHistReviewSearch (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (proposed rule went to OIRA on 
Oct. 21, 2009, and review was completed on Jan. 6, 2010). 
 175. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938, 
2997 (Jan. 19, 2010). 
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It would be bizarre to say that stopping a decision that 
everyone knew about, 2-1/2 years into the process, was justified 
on the ground that stopping it was a good way to govern.  It was 
the opposite: it was a bad way to govern.  It wasted tremendous 
agency resources and valuable time; it put the agency back at 
square one in figuring out how to manage the ozone problem 
under the Bush-era standard; it sent a wave of distrust and 
disbelief through agency ranks and outside supporters of the 
agency; and it put the government in the difficult position of 
defending the Bush-era standard left in place.  Unleashing chaos 
cannot be what Sunstein means when he says that the ozone 
decision was correct “on the merits”; but that was the decision’s 
effect. 
Under the common law of 13,563, then, rules can fail for a 
variety of reasons: they can reflect an OIRA-disapproved 
understanding of the role of cost-benefit analysis under the 
relevant laws; they can fail a cost-benefit test; or they can be bad 
ideas on some unspecified theory of the “merits.”  Perhaps these 
are some of the reasons so many EPA rules seem permanently 
stuck at OIRA, as I next discuss. 
D. When Does Review End (and Begin)? 
The common law of 13,563 also determines the timelines 
under which OIRA operates.  As discussed above, EO 13,563 
explicitly reaffirms EO 12,866, which is the executive order that 
sets forth timelines for OIRA review: 10 days for pre-rule actions, 
45 days for final rules on subjects already reviewed and little 
changed, 90 days for everything else.176  EO 12,866 also, as I have 
said, seems clearly to contemplate one 30-day extension if the 
OMB Director and the agency head agree to it.177 
This is not the way the OIRA process now works.  Many, 
many rules linger at OIRA long past the 90- or 120-day 
deadline.178  Many pre-rule actions stay long past 10 days.179  
Some rules have been at OIRA for years.180 
 
 176. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(2)(A), (B), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). 
 177. Id. § 6(b)(2)(C). 
 178. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
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Sunstein explains that, in fact, the prevailing understanding 
of EO 12,866 holds that an agency head may, on her own, request 
an indefinite extension of OIRA review.181  This would mean that 
neither the requirement that the OMB Director agree “in writing” 
to the extension nor the requirement that the extension be once, 
for 30 days only, holds under the present understanding of EO 
12,866.  This would, in turn, mean that if an agency head asks for 
an extension, there actually is no deadline for completing OIRA 
review. 
This remodeling of EO 12,866’s structure on the timelines for 
review is news in and of itself.  Many outside observers believe 
that there is in fact a deadline for OIRA review.182  OIRA itself 
encourages this (mis)understanding by displaying 90 days as a 
timing benchmark on its regulatory dashboard.183 
But it is worse than that.  It is worse because the way that 
agency heads come to request extended review, in my experience, 
is that OIRA calls an official at the agency and asks the agency to 
ask for an extension.  It is clear, in such a phone call, that the 
agency is not to decline to ask for such an extension.  Thus, not 
only is there no deadline for OIRA review, but OIRA itself 
controls the agency’s “requests” for extensions.  In this way, it 
comes to pass that rules can remain at OIRA for years. 
Quite apart from not knowing when OIRA review ends, it is 
also sometimes hard for the public to know when OIRA review 
begins.  It has been widely reported that OIRA has lately been in 
the habit of not allowing agencies to send rules for review until 
OIRA has cleared them for review – a kind of pre-clearance 
procedure uncomfortably reminiscent of the Bush-era failure of 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1846-47 n. 37. 
 182. See, e.g., Megan R. Wilson, Printers to Obama: Please Regulate Our 
Cleaning Rags, THE HILL’S REGWATCH (Apr. 29, 2013), available at 
http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/pending-regs/296827-printers-to-obama-please-
regulate-our-cleaning-rags (“Laws stipulate that the agency then has 90 days to 
review the drafts before returning them to agencies for correction or 
publication…”). 
 183. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
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OIRA to be in receiving mode when the endangerment finding 
and rules on cars went over for review.184 
Some documents on publicly available websites corroborate 
these reports.  EPA maintains a website, the Regulatory 
Development and Retrospective Review Tracker (“Reg DaRRT”), 
that is supposed to track important moments in the development 
of EPA rules.185  Inspired by the Bush-era fiasco of the un-
uploaded package on endangerment and cars, EPA designed a 
timeline with two dates relevant to OIRA review: one noting the 
date when EPA sends a regulatory package to OIRA, and one 
noting the date when OIRA “receives” the package.186  A space of 
a day or two between these two dates might mean nothing; it 
might mean that the package went over late in the day, for 
example, and no one was around to upload it at OIRA.  But a 
space of anything more than that may signal that OIRA has 
lapsed into non-receiving mode.  Thus, for example, looking at the 
Reg DaRRT entry on EPA’s rule requiring electronic reporting by 
Clean Water Act permittees, one can see that the rule went to 
OIRA on December 22, 2011, but was not received by OIRA until 
January 20, 2012.187  It would be unusual to have this long a 
space between sending and receipt unless OIRA had identified 
some problem with the package. 
Comparing EO 12,866 documents on regulations.gov to 
OIRA’s own posted review dates can also be illuminating.  On 
regulations.gov, one can see that EPA sent a rule relating to 
renewable fuels to OIRA on November 20, 2012188 – but OIRA 
 
 184. See supra text at note 69. 
 185. US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-588T, FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY 
AND SECURITY SYSTEM: FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS 
FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
120/110801.pdf. 
 186. See, among many others, Formaldehyde Emissions Standards for 
Composite Wood Products, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/rulegate.nsf/ 
byRIN/2070-AJ92?opendocument (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (showing date sent 
to OMB for review and date received by OMB). 
 187. NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/ 
rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2020-AA47?opendocument (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). 
 188. NPRM as Sent to OMB on 11/20/12, REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2012-0621-0003 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2013). 
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itself reports that it received this rule on January 30, 2013.189  
Some regulatory actions seem caught forever in email limbo 
between EPA and OIRA.  A Notice of Data Availability on coal 
ash, for example, appears to have been sent to OIRA on March 
12, 2012190 – but the notice did not appear on OIRA’s log of items 
under review until April 13, 2013.191  Needless to say, even if 
OIRA did indeed respect the EO 12,866 deadlines once items are 
accepted by it for review, these deadlines would mean little if 
OIRA simply does not accept certain regulatory actions for review 
or only accepts them long after they have been sent. 
To sum up, on the matter of deadlines, OIRA has broken 
entirely free from the constraints of EO 12,866.  The 10-day, 45-
day, and 90-day time limits on OIRA review perhaps survive as 
benchmarks, but nothing more.  To maintain the fiction that 
deadlines still exist, OIRA extends review indefinitely at the 
“request” of agency heads – but these requests, in my experience, 
often are instigated by OIRA itself.  To make matters worse, 
OIRA has fudged its own failure to meet the deadlines imposed 
by EO 12,866 by simply not “receiving” some regulatory packages 
until long after they are sent. 
E. What Are We Told? 
The last facet of the common law of EO 13,563 compounds 
the problems created by OIRA’s other innovations to the 
regulatory review process prescribed in EO 12,866: OIRA follows, 
and allows the agencies to follow, almost none of the disclosure 
requirements of EO 12,866.  OIRA also nowhere has written 
down the elements of its common law of regulatory review.  This 
is why we are left to speculate about who is in charge of 
regulatory review.  This is why so many people think OIRA 
reviews only really big and important rules, and perhaps why 
 
 189. Entry on RFS Renewable Identification Number (RIN) Quality Assurance 
Program, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistReviewSearch (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). 
 190. Standards for the Management of Coal Combustion Residuals Generated 
by Commercial Electric Power Producers, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
opei/rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2050-AE81?opendocument. (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 191. OFFICE OF INFORMATION & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, www.reginfo.gov (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
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some believe that agencies can easily evade OIRA review 
altogether.  This is why outsiders think there actually are 
deadlines for OIRA review and also think OIRA’s website 
contains a full listing of items under OIRA scrutiny.  The 
misconceptions about OIRA review would not be possible if OIRA 
either actually met the disclosure requirements of EO 12,866 or 
were more forthcoming about the many alterations it has made to 
the process described in the executive order. 
OIRA does not explain in writing to agencies that items on 
their regulatory agenda do not fit with the President’s agenda.192  
OIRA does not keep a publicly available log explaining when and 
by whom disputes between OIRA and the agencies were elevated.  
Indeed, when the first elevation of an EPA rule occurred in 
President Obama’s first term, I drafted a brief memo for the 
EPA’s docket explaining that elevation had occurred and noting 
the outcome. OIRA told me in no uncertain terms that the memo 
must not be made public. Moreover, except in one instance – 
President Obama’s direction to then-EPA Administrator Lisa 
Jackson to withdraw the final rule setting a new air quality 
standard for ozone – OIRA has not returned rules to agencies 
with a written explanation about why they have not passed OIRA 
review.193  Instead, as discussed above, OIRA simply hangs onto 
the rules indefinitely, and they wither quietly on the vine.  This is 
how it comes to pass that a list of chemicals of concern or a 
workplace rule on crystalline silica lingers at OIRA for years. 
Some agencies do post “before” and “after” versions of rules 
that have gone to OIRA.  These redlined documents often feature 
hundreds of changes.  There is nothing here like the “complete, 
clear, and simple manner” of disclosure contemplated by the 
Executive Order.  There is also often no document that explains 
which changes were made at OIRA’s behest.  Where, as Sunstein 
explains, changes might come from OIRA, from another White 
House office, from another Cabinet head, or from a career staffer 
 
 192. The next several paragraphs are drawn from Lisa Heinzerling, Who Will 
Run the EPA?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (April 2013), available at 
http://jreg.commons.yale.edu/who-will-run-the-epa/. 
 193. The website on regulatory review shows only one return letter (on ozone) 
issued during the Obama administration.  OIRA Return Letters, OFFICE OF INFO. 
& REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
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in a separate agency, the failure to follow the Executive Order’s 
rules on transparency means that no one is ultimately 
accountable for the changes that occur.  Who is responsible, for 
example, for the hundreds of technical changes made to the EPA’s 
scientific analyses of air quality rules?194  We simply do not know. 
Here, too, OIRA is the stumbling block when it comes to 
transparency.  Agencies know full well that they are not to be too 
transparent.  OIRA reprimanded the EPA when the EPA 
accidentally posted interagency comments on its proposal to 
regulate coal ash impoundments.195  But why shouldn’t the public 
know who is responsible for changing the rules?  In fact, without 
knowing the expertise and affiliation of the kibitzers, it is hard to 
evaluate their comments. 
The problems go deeper still.  OIRA maintains a “Regulatory 
Review Dashboard” that contains a good deal of information 
about rules under review, how long they have been under review, 
and so on.196  It is spiffy and informative, but woefully 
incomplete.  Some rules go to OIRA “informally” and do not 
appear on the Dashboard at that time.  Some rules go to OIRA 
and appear on the Dashboard only weeks after the agency has 
sent them.197  Some rules are done, from the agency’s perspective, 
 
 194. Wendy Wagner has painstakingly documented such changes in a study 
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States.  WENDY 
WAGNER, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING 
APPROACHES (2013), available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf. 
 195. See CENT. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, CHANGES TO COAL ASH PROPOSAL PLACE 
UTILITY’S CONCERNS ABOVE PUBLIC HEALTH (2010), available at 
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11041 (recounting the same episode). 
 196. See generally OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS; OFFICE OF MGMT. 
AND BUDGET, REGULATORY REVIEW DASHBOARD, http://www.reginfo.gov (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 197. For example, compare the EPA’s report of when it sent its rule on 
electronic reporting regarding water pollution permits to OIRA on, Dec. 22, 
2011, to its report when OIRA “received” the rule on, Jan. 20, 2012.  See NPDES 
Electronic Reporting Rule, EPA, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/rulegate.nsf/byRIN/2020-AA47?opendocument (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2013) (listing dates for “NPRM: Sent to OMB for Regulatory 
Review” and “NPRM: Received by OMB”).  See also Search Results for NPRM 
Review Status, Regulatory Review Dashboard, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (search “RIN” for 
“2020-AA47” and search “Agency for Environmental Protection Agency) 
(showing OMB’s received date to be Jan. 20, 2012). 
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but the White House prevents their transmittal to OIRA.198  The 
truth is, the Dashboard purports to be, but is not, a full picture of 
the items under review at any given time.  Thus it misleads at 
the same time it informs. 
So far I have explained the ways in which OIRA review, as 
practiced today, departs from the executive order it purports to be 
following, EO 12,866.  I have suggested, along the way, reasons to 
think OIRA’s practice may not be ideal.  Now, I turn to the 
normative perspective in earnest, and explain why I believe 
OIRA’s process of regulatory review is deeply problematic along 
several different dimensions.199 
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH OIRA 
In this paper, I have focused mainly on a descriptive account 
of the OIRA review process as it exists today.  I believe this 
descriptive account is essential because there is so much 
misunderstanding about how OIRA actually operates.  But this 
paper would be incomplete without a discussion of the normative 
problems created by OIRA’s current practices.  Other scholars 
have covered these problems well;200 for this article, I rest with a 
relatively brief discussion. 
I lead off with the last topic I covered in discussing the 
common law of EO 13,563: transparency.  The opacity of the 
OIRA process has two large problems.  The first is that opacity in 
government in general is a problem.  It prevents people from 
understanding the way their government operates, how they can 
intervene and at what points, what the government is up to, who 
is making important decisions, why the government has made 
 
 198. Juliet Eilperin, Obama Administration Slows Environmental Rules as it 
Weighs Political Cost, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2012, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-12/national/35442360_1_mercury-
emissions-obama-administration-light-trucks (stating that the White House had 
not given EPA permission to send a rule on cars and trucks to OMB). 
 199. For a compelling argument that OIRA review is so problematic that it 
should be scrapped altogether, see Steinzor, supra note 6. 
 200. Indispensable articles in this literature, spanning a long period, include: 
Steinzor, supra note 6;  Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 53; Thomas O. 
McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. 
L. REV. 443 (1987); Percival, supra note 51; Morrison, supra note 17; Olson, 
supra note 49. 
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those decisions.  The problems with opacity are, in fact, what led 
President Clinton to include disclosure requirements in EO 
12,866 in the first place.201 
Another problem with opacity in the OIRA process is that 
transparency is promised but not delivered.  Opacity about 
transparency is the worst kind of opacity; people think a lack of 
information on a subject means there is nothing relevant to 
report, when in fact it might mean they are just not being told.  
Thus it is especially troubling, given the gaps in transparency I 
have described, that Sunstein continues to tout the transparency 
of the OIRA process.202  If believed, this claim would lull people 
into thinking they have all the information they might need or 
want about this process.  But they do not.  Moreover, to claim 
transparency but offer mostly opacity is especially bad in an 
administration that has made openness in government one of its 
signature initiatives. 
A second problem with OIRA review as it is now conducted is 
the one flagged by OLC in 1981 when it reviewed EO 12,291.  
OLC cautioned, as I have said, that displacement of discretion by 
White House personnel might run afoul of the laws lodging 
discretion within a particular agency or with a particular official 
at a particular agency.203  Since that time, the academic 
literature on this issue has burgeoned, with many scholars on 
both sides of the political divide arguing that certainly the 
President has the authority to order political appointees within 
the agencies to make particular decisions.  Perhaps most 
famously, then-professor Elena Kagan argued that statutes that 
give discretion to particular agencies or to particular officials 
within particular agencies are best read as implicit delegations of 
authority to the President to dictate specific regulatory 
outcomes.204  Other scholars have followed Kagan’s lead and 
argued that it is nonsensical to read much of anything into 
Congress’s particular choices about who is to make particular 
 
 201. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 878 (2003). 
 202. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1854. 
 203. Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, 
62-63 (Feb. 13, 1981). 
 204. Kagan, supra note 25, at 2288-90. 
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regulatory decisions.205  What sense would it make, they ask, for 
Congress to give the President the authority to designate 
Superfund sites but not to give him directive authority over the 
setting of the NAAQS?206  Some statutes give authority to the 
President, many others to agencies, and there appears to be no 
rhyme or reason in these choices.207 
But if having rhyme or reason is a prerequisite for respecting 
Congress’s choices, we have a lot of work to do unraveling its 
handiwork.  Congress also has given USDA authority over meat 
but not cheese,208 it has given FDA authority over eggs but not 
egg products,209 it has given EPA authority over open waters but 
it requires EPA to share its authority over wetlands with the 
Army Corps of Engineers,210 it has given DOT authority over fuel 
economy standards but not tailpipe standards for greenhouse 
gases.211  The law is filled with delegations of authority that do 
not make obvious sense.  But no one argues that FDA could just 
take over USDA’s meat inspections, or that EPA could take over 
the Army Corps’ functions with respect to wetlands.  Even more 
tellingly, few other than those who believe in a strongly unitary 
executive believe that the President can simply ignore Congress’s 
choices about whether the head of an agency can be removed for 
any reason or must only be removed for cause.212  Yet it makes 
little sense, as far as I can tell, to have an independent SEC but a 
dependent EPA, or to have an independent FTC but a dependent 
CPSC.  Why should we think nothing of ignoring Congress’s 
instructions as to who within the executive branch should make 
particular decisions, but then cling tightly to its instructions 
about how to remove particular officials? 
 
 205. See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory 
Authority Over Agency Action, 79 FORD. L. REV. 2455 (2011). 
 206. Id. at 2466. 
 207. Id. at 2466-68. 
 208. See US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 185, at 3, 21. 
 209. 21 U.S.C. 331 § 331 (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012).  For a critique of the 
resulting regulatory patchwork, see Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: 
What If Consolidation Isn’t Enough?, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1357-59 (2007). 
 210. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
 211. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
 212. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 25, at 2326-27. 
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To delve fully into these issues would take me beyond the 
scope of this paper.  My basic point is that it is not at all obvious 
that a delegation to a specific agency to make a specific decision 
delegates authority to the President to make that decision 
himself.  It is even less obvious that such a delegation gives 
decision-making authority to OIRA career staff, other agencies’ 
career staff, Cabinet members outside the relevant agency, the 
White House Chief of Staff, and others, apart from the President.  
Even if one believed that the President himself has decision-
making power, Sunstein’s account of the way the OIRA process 
actually works shows that it is almost never the President 
himself who is making the relevant calls, it is OIRA career staff 
and other agencies’ career staff and other Cabinet officials and 
the Council of Economic Advisors and the White House Chief of 
Staff and a cast of many others.213  To suggest that all of these 
players somehow can appropriately partake of the President’s 
own power is ludicrous.  It would be to suggest that the entire 
executive branch is “the President.” 
Thus, as in 1981, there remains a significant legal issue 
whether OIRA may exercise decision-making authority – not just 
oversight – with respect to regulatory decisions lodged by statute 
in particular agencies. 
A third large problem with OIRA review as it is now 
conducted is that it lacks accountability.  No one knows who is 
really in charge.  Sunstein’s account of the process has only 
deepened the impression that the process is chaotic and 
unpredictable, lacking clear lines of authority and producing 
outcomes that have no clear author.  The precise process set out 
in EO 12,866 for resolving disputes between the action agency 
and OIRA has given way to a blurry struggle for power in a 
process that remains opaque and mysterious even to the closest 
participants in it.  Chaos, opacity, mystery: these are not the 
hallmarks of accountability.  Since OIRA review is founded in 
part on a perceived need for greater accountability in the 
regulatory domain, the absence of accountability in this process 
undercuts the very reason for that review. 
 
 213. See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1855-59; see also 
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 53, at 68 (counting 19 different White 
House offices involved in OIRA review). 
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The accountability deficit is worsened by officials’ insistence 
that, despite all that I have shown here, it really is the agencies 
that are in charge of regulatory policy.  Sunstein reports that 
“[a]gencies decline to accept changes with which they disagree” 
and that “[w]hen changes are made, the agency assents to 
them.”214  “It is true, of course,” Sunstein allows, “that OIRA has 
a good deal of formal authority under Executive Orders 12866 
and 13563.  That authority matters.  But in important cases, the 
agency convinces OIRA and others, on the merits, that its 
position is indisputably correct, or that it is reasonable enough 
even if not indisputably correct.  And in important cases, the 
agency concludes that the views suggested by OIRA, and pressed 
by interagency reviewers, are clearly correct, or that they are 
reasonable enough even if not clearly correct.”215  I do not know 
why Sunstein believes that agencies come to understand that 
OIRA’s positions are “clearly correct”; I believe, instead, that they 
often come to understand simply that OIRA is clearly in charge.  
But the continuing assertion that agencies accept OIRA’s views, 
even welcome them, further dilutes accountability for the 
regulatory decisions in question. 
Last but not least, the current process of OIRA review hits 
environmental protection especially hard.  EPA most often leads 
the federal pack in terms of the number of its rules under review 
at any given time.  Most of the EPA rules OIRA reviews are not 
economically significant.  As of May 7, 2013, 15 of the 22 EPA 
rules under review had been there for over a year.  As shown in 
redlined versions of EPA rules showing changes during OIRA 
review, OIRA devotes extreme attention – and sometimes little 
deference – to EPA’s technical judgments.216  Whole categories of 
rules protecting the environment fare poorly in the cost-benefit 
analysis OIRA demands.217  Perhaps it is not surprising that a 
centralized structure first developed in the Nixon years to 
undercut protections under the new federal environmental laws 
would still, in 2013, save its strongest fire for these same 
protections.  But it is a shame that so little has changed. 
 
 214. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 5, at 1847. 
 215. Id. at 1873 (footnote omitted). 
 216. See text at note 165 & note 194, supra. 
 217. See text at notes 144-46, supra. 
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/5
HEINZERLING - FINAL- NUMBERED 3/26/2014 11:23 AM 
2014] INSIDE EPA 369 
 
Solving at least some of these problems with OIRA review 
would be simple: OIRA could just follow the rules laid down in 
EO 12,866.  If OIRA followed EO 12,866’s requirements for 
transparency, a good number of the issues surrounding OIRA’s 
opacity would disappear.  If OIRA followed the spirit of 12,866 
and 13,563 insofar as they do not envision OIRA changing the 
laws under which agencies operate, the problem of OIRA 
interfering with the agencies’ best judgments about the 
appropriate interpretations of the statutes they administer would 
go away.  If OIRA followed the process EO 12,866 requires for 
elevation and dispute resolution at the highest levels, and if 
OIRA followed the disclosure requirements pertaining to such 
matters, some of the concerns about accountability would be 
mitigated.  If OIRA kept to EO 12,866’s deadlines, at least 
indefinite delay would not be one of the intrusions it visits upon 
the agencies.  If OIRA sent return letters to agencies when it 
rejected rules, explaining in writing why it rejected them, there 
would exist a focal point for substantive discussion and 
accountability would be enhanced.  Much can be done to improve 
things, in other words, simply by following the executive order 
President Obama himself has reaffirmed. 
Other problems would be trickier to resolve.  There would 
remain the overarching legal issue of whether it is fair to assume 
that statutes giving decision-making authority to executive 
agencies also give decision-making authority to the President (or 
his aides in OIRA and the larger White House).  If the cast of 
thousands Sunstein describes still played a role in regulatory 
review, there would remain a serious accountability deficit.  And, 
so long as the culture at OIRA does not change and so long as 
cost-benefit is the decision tool of choice, environmental 
protection will suffer. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I hope that the descriptive account I have provided here, 
aimed at correcting the misimpressions that have grown up 
around OIRA review, will help to renew the debate over the role 
of OIRA and the larger White House in agency rulemaking. 
45
